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I. INTRODUCTION
Striking the critical balance between a state’s interest in
regulating the practice of medicine and a physician’s First Amendment
right of free speech is not easy. In Stuart v. Camnitz, the Fourth Circuit
grappled with this very issue. The court considered whether a North
Carolina statute that required physicians to describe the development of
the fetus to a woman seeking an abortion violates the First Amendment.
The court concluded that such a statute that compelled ideological
speech by physicians as a prerequisite to abortion procedures infringed
the physicians’ First Amendment rights
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In 2011, North Carolina’s General Assembly overrode the
Governor’s veto and passed the Woman’s Right to Know Act (“the
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Act”).1 Under one provision of the Act, physicians were required, “to
perform an ultrasound, display the sonogram, and describe the fetus to
women seeking abortions.”2
referred

to

as

the

These requirements are collectively

“Real-Time

View

Requirement”

(“the

Requirement”).3 The Act required compliance from physicians even if
the patient did not wish to view the sonogram or listen to the physician’s
descriptions.4 A patient could refuse to look at the sonogram and cover
her ears, but the physician was nonetheless required to place the
sonogram within her line of sight and give the enumerated details.5
Additionally, the Act required physicians to inform a patient of the risks
of the procedure and of alternate options.6
A group of physicians and clinics brought suit in the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina prior to the Act
becoming effective seeking to enjoin enforcement of the Act.7 The
District Court initially granted only a preliminary injunction against the
enforcement of the Requirement portion of the Act.8 The District Court
permitted the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint alleging that the

1

Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 242 (4th Cir. 2014).
Id. In describing the fetus, a physician must include such details as the fetus’s
“members and internal organs, if present and viewable.” Id. at 243 (citing N.C. GEN
STAT. § 90-21.85(a)(4)(2011)).
3
Id.
4
Id. at 243.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id.
2
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Act infringed on physicians’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.9
The District Court, applying intermediate scrutiny,10 found that the
Requirement constituted a violation of the physicians’ rights under the
First Amendment and granted a permanent injunction against
enforcement of the Requirement.11

The District Court found that

intermediate scrutiny was appropriate here specifically because the
Requirement was a speech-regulating provision.12
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit first considered the appropriate
level of scrutiny under which to view this case.13 The Court found that
the Requirement was an example of “quintessential compelled speech”
because it required physicians to say certain things to their patients
regardless of the physician’s professional opinion.14 Further, the Court
noted that compelled speech is inherently content-based.15 The North
Carolina Legislature expressed its clear intent of the Requirement to
dissuade patients from going through with planned abortion

9

Id.
Intermediate scrutiny is a test to determine the constitutionality of certain statutes,
which asks whether the statute in question “further[s] an important government
interest” and “do[es] so by means that are substantially related to that interest.”
Intermediate Scrutiny, WEX LEGAL DICTIONARY,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/intermediate_scrutiny (last visited Mar. 5, 2018).
11
Stuart, 774 F.3d at 244.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 244–45.
14
Id. at 246.
15
Id.
10
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procedures.16 Thus, the Court found that the Requirement not only
compels physicians to make certain statements, but it compels this
speech in order to further a political agenda.17 While “[c]ontent-based
regulations of speech typically receive strict scrutiny[,]” the Court
continued its analysis of the appropriate level of scrutiny by examining
the Requirement’s function as a regulation on the practice of medicine.18
The state argued that the Requirement was “merely a regulation
of the practice of medicine[,]” which ordinarily receives only rational
basis scrutiny.19

The Court acknowledged the state’s authority to

regulate the practice of medicine, noting specifically that “the state may
require the provision of information sufficient for patients to give their
informed consent to medical procedures. . . .”20 However, when a
regulation attempts to compel speech from a professional in the practice
of his or her duties, courts must balance the scrutiny required for “public
dialogue” with that required for the “regulation of professional
conduct.”21

The Court here found that the Requirement regulated

medical treatment in that it required certain conduct of treating

16

Id. at 245.
Id. (stating that the Requirement “explicitly promotes a pro-life message by
demanding the provision of facts that all fall on one side of the abortion debate. . .
.”).
18
Id. at 246.
19
Id. at 246–47.
20
Id. at 247 (citing Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The
court further noted that the state’s authority to regulate the practice of medicine “is
not lost whenever the practice . . . entails speech.” Id. (quoting Lowe v. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, 472 U.S. 181, 228 (1985) (White, J., concurring in the judgment)).
21
Id. at 248 (quoting Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1227 (9th Cir. 2013)).
17

2018]

IN YOUR PROFESSIONAL OPINION

75

physicians, and was simultaneously a content-based regulation of
speech, thus warranting review under intermediate scrutiny.22
In applying intermediate scrutiny to this case, the Fourth Circuit
set itself apart from the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, both of which applied
only rational basis review in holding that similar “ultrasound displayand-describe requirement[s]” did not violate physicians’ First
Amendment rights.23 Both the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, relying in part
on Planned Parenthood v. Casey,24 found that these requirements fall
within states’ power to require physicians to provide “truthful, [and]
nonmisleading” information to their patients.25 The Fourth Circuit
noted, however, that while Casey permits “reasonable licensing and
regulation” on physicians’ speech, physicians do not “forfeit their First
Amendment rights” when performing abortions.26 The court concluded
that intermediate scrutiny comports with the Supreme Court’s holding
in Casey27 and appropriately balances the “regulation of speech and the

22

Id. at 245, 248.
See, Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570 (5th
Cir. 2012); Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D., v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889 (8th Cir.
2012).
24
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
25
Stuart, 774 F.3d at 248–49.
26
Id. at 249.
27
Casey, 505 U.S. at 884 (stating that a physician’s First Amendment right within
the practice of medicine is “subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the
State” and thus, requiring a physician to inform a patient of the risks of abortion does
not violate such a right).
23
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regulation of the medical profession” with regard to abortion
procedures.28
The court next analyzed the Requirement under intermediate
scrutiny.29 The court recognized the state’s interest in preserving fetal
life, but also noted the importance of ensuring that the promotion of that
interest does not infringe on “individual liberty interests or competing
state concerns.”30 Other important state interests included “promoting
the health of its citizens, . . . promoting the psychological health of
women seeking abortions, . . . promoting a healthy doctor-patient
relationship, . . . [and] respecting physicians’ professional judgment.”31
The court noted however, that these state interests must not be held as
so paramount as to require physicians to surrender their constitutional
rights in the practice of medicine.32
The state argued that the Requirement plays the same role as
traditional informed consent, but the court found that the Requirement
significantly deviated from the purposes of traditional informed
consent.33

The purpose of informed consent is to ensure “patient

autonomy” which exists when the patient can “meaningfully consent to

28

Stuart, 774 F.3d at 249.
Id. at 250.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 250–51.
32
Id. at 251.
33
Id. at 251–52.
29
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medical procedures.”34 Such consent can be given only when the patient
has received sufficient information to freely make meaningful
decisions.35 Traditionally, informed consent requires the physician to
determine the appropriate medical information to tell the patient based
on a reasonable person standard.36 While the physician is obligated to
provide all information necessary for a patient to be able to give her
informed consent, the patient has the right to decline hearing such
information.37 The court found that the Requirement went beyond
requiring physicians to provide patients with information necessary to
make an autonomous decision and “impose[d] a virtually unprecedented
burden on the right of professional speech that operate[d] to the
detriment of both speaker and listener.”38
Further, the court further found that the Requirement did not
seek to balance the state’s interests with the constitutional rights of
physicians and patients.39 The court specifically noted that requiring a
physician to display the sonogram and describe the fetus even if the
patient closed her eyes and covered her ears bears no state interest

34

Id. at 251 (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
36
Id. The reasonable person standard for traditional informed consent takes into
account “what a reasonable physician would convey, what a reasonable patient
would want to know, and what the individual patient would subjectively wish to
know given the patient’s individualized needs and treatment circumstances.” Id.
37
Id. at 252.
38
Id.
39
Id.
35
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whatsoever, and cannot contribute to the patient’s informed consent.40
Additionally, the court pointed out that the Requirement could actually
impede informed consent by forcing the patient to consume information
while in a vulnerable position—specifically, “half-naked or disrobed on
her back on an examination table, with an ultrasound probe either on her
belly or inserted into her vagina.”

41

As the court points out, such a

setting may impair a patient’s judgment, which refutes the argument that
the Requirement aids the patient in making an informed decision.42
The court, finding that the Requirement did not further the
state’s interest in promoting informed consent in medical decisions,
exceeded the permissible regulation of the practice of medicine, and
“impose[d] an extraordinary burden on [physicians’] expressive rights,
held that the Requirement violated the First Amendment and affirmed
the District Court’s permanent injunction on enforcement of that
provision.”43
IV. CONCLUSION
The Stuart decision marks a critical departure from its sister
circuits as to a physician’s right to refrain from speech that, in her
professional opinion, is not in the patient’s best interest. Stuart provides
a framework for balancing individual constitutional rights with a state’s

40

Id.
Id. at 255.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 255–56.
41
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legitimate interests in regulating the practice of medicine and preserving
fetal life. This case further highlights the role of physicians as key
stakeholders in the abortion debate and provides a creative alternative
for challenging restrictions on abortions by focusing on the rights of
physicians.
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